By Gary Revel
Abstract
This article advances a normative and strategic argument for nonviolent civil resistance as the most effective and ethical response to contemporary political conflict in the United States, drawing on Gary Revel’s campaign for nonviolence as a primary normative framework. Situating Revel’s claims within the comparative politics literature, especially the work of Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, the article highlights evidence that nonviolent campaigns have historically been more successful than violent ones in achieving political goals and in generating durable democratic outcomes. It then contrasts major nonviolent movements—such as the U.S. civil rights movement and the women’s suffrage movement—with recent episodes of violence, including the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol, to demonstrate the divergent strategic and ethical trajectories of civil resistance versus criminal political violence. The article concludes that adopting Revel’s nonviolent ethos in American political life is not only morally preferable but strategically necessary to preserve constitutional democracy against escalating partisan confrontation.
Introduction
In the context of intensifying polarization and populist rhetoric in the United States, public discourse increasingly frames politics as a zero‑sum conflict between irreconcilable camps. Gary Revel’s contemporaneous appeal for a “campaign for non‑violence” in response to what he characterizes as a war on the American way of life led by President Donald Trump articulates a counter‑model rooted in civil engagement rather than physical confrontation. This article develops that call into a structured inquiry: under what conditions is nonviolent resistance more effective than violence in advancing political objectives and safeguarding democratic institutions in the contemporary United States?
Building on the comparative empirical literature, the article argues that nonviolent resistance offers both superior strategic outcomes and a more robust ethical foundation than violent politics, particularly in a constitutional democracy where legal avenues for contestation remain available. It further contends that recent criminal episodes of political violence in the United States exemplify the self‑defeating nature of violent tactics, which tend to delegitimize movements, harm innocents, and provoke state repression without durable gains.
Theoretical Framework: Strategic Nonviolence
Chenoweth and Stephan’s landmark study of 323 resistance campaigns from 1900 to 2006 demonstrates that nonviolent campaigns were more than twice as likely as violent ones to achieve maximalist political goals such as regime change or territorial independence. Their analysis attributes this success to higher rates of participation, lower barriers to entry, and greater tactical innovation in nonviolent campaigns, which collectively increase the probability of elite defections and shifts in loyalty within state institutions.
Moreover, successful nonviolent campaigns are associated with more durable and internally peaceful democratic outcomes, whereas violent campaigns are more likely to culminate in renewed authoritarianism or civil war. In this literature, nonviolence is not understood as passivity but as a strategic repertoire of disruption—boycotts, strikes, demonstrations, and institutional engagement—that leverages numbers, legitimacy, and discipline rather than armed force. Revel’s emphasis on “public discourse, political campaigns, debates, and elections” aligns closely with this strategic logic, recasting civic participation as an organized form of resistance rather than a mere procedural obligation.
Gary Revel’s Campaign for Nonviolence
Revel’s recent writing frames the present U.S. moment as one in which citizens may perceive themselves to be in a “war‑like right‑wing versus left‑wing arena of engagements,” yet he insists that violence is neither necessary nor effective as a political tool. He underscores that assaults and batteries committed in political contexts remain crimes prosecutable under ordinary law, underscoring the legal and personal risks of escalation even where participants view themselves as acting under righteous or patriotic motives.
Crucially, Revel’s call directs citizens toward what might be termed “thick” civic engagement—participation in campaigns, debates, elections, and even private conversations—as the appropriate space for political struggle. This framing dovetails with civil‑resistance scholarship emphasizing that democratic institutions, however strained, still provide channels that can be reappropriated for transformative nonviolent action, as evidenced historically by social movements that used elections, courts, and legislatures alongside protest to achieve change.
Historical Examples of Nonviolent Movements
Nonviolent movements in U.S. history provide empirical grounding for Revel’s normative appeal. The U.S. civil rights movement between the mid‑1950s and late 1960s deployed nonviolent tactics—boycotts, marches, sit‑ins, and freedom rides—to challenge racial segregation and disenfranchisement, contributing to landmark federal legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. These campaigns, while occurring in the face of severe state and vigilante violence, maintained a disciplined nonviolent posture that bolstered their legitimacy and broadened coalitions across racial and regional lines.
Similarly, the U.S. women’s suffrage movement relied heavily on nonviolent strategies, including demonstrations, parades, lobbying, and civil disobedience, to secure the Nineteenth Amendment’s ratification in 1920. Organizations on both sides—pro‑suffrage associations and groups like the National Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage—engaged primarily via publications, organized events, and state‑level campaigns, highlighting how even deeply contested political conflicts can unfold within a nonviolent, though contentious, civic sphere.
Contemporary Nonviolent Civic Engagement in the United States
In recent decades, diverse movements in the United States have continued this nonviolent tradition, employing mass demonstrations, digital organizing, and legal advocacy to address issues ranging from racial justice and police violence to immigration policy and climate change. These campaigns frequently utilize tactics identified in the civil‑resistance literature as high‑leverage: large‑scale peaceful protests, consumer boycotts, and targeted political pressure aimed at elected officials and corporate actors.
While some protests have been accompanied by sporadic property damage or clashes with law enforcement, the overwhelming strategic emphasis among major movements has been on peaceful assemblies and institutional engagement, precisely the modes of action Revel urges as alternatives to violent confrontation. The persistence of nonviolent strategies in the face of policy setbacks illustrates the capacity of civic actors to sustain pressure without abandoning the commitment to lawful or minimally disruptive tactics.
Criminal Political Violence: The January 6 Attack
At the opposite pole stand explicitly violent episodes such as the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol, in which a pro‑Trump mob attempted to disrupt the certification of the presidential election results. Investigations and criminal proceedings have documented assaults on law‑enforcement officers, the use of improvised weapons, and forced entry into restricted government facilities, resulting in multiple deaths, serious injuries, and extensive property damage. These acts led to hundreds of federal prosecutions for offenses ranging from unlawful entry and obstruction of an official proceeding to assault and seditious conspiracy.
From a strategic perspective, the Capitol attack failed to achieve its proximate objective—the interruption of certification—and generated broad public and institutional backlash against both perpetrators and their political allies. The event also provided justification for heightened security measures and expanded law‑enforcement surveillance of political gatherings, consequences that civil‑resistance scholars identify as common outcomes when movements adopt or tolerate violent tactics. In this sense, January 6 stands as a paradigmatic example of what Revel warns against: criminal deeds carried out in the name of political grievance that ultimately undermine the professed cause and endanger innocents.
Other Forms of Partisan Violence and Intimidation
Beyond singular dramatic events, the United States has witnessed a rise in politically motivated intimidation, including armed demonstrations, threats against election workers, and targeted assaults on public officials and activists. These actions blur the line between protest and coercion, using the implicit or explicit threat of force to shape political behavior rather than relying on persuasion or institutional processes.
Revel’s concern about a “war‑like right‑wing versus left‑wing arena” captures the atmospherics that can normalize such conduct, especially when political elites portray opponents as existential enemies rather than legitimate adversaries in a shared democratic system. In legal terms, however, assaults, menacing, and property destruction remain prosecutable offenses irrespective of political motivation, reinforcing his argument that resorting to violence inevitably exposes participants to criminal liability while offering little strategic advantage.
Ethical and Legal Considerations
Ethically, nonviolence aligns with deontological commitments to respect persons as ends in themselves and with consequentialist concerns about minimizing harm to innocents. Nonviolent tactics seek to transform relationships of power without inflicting physical injury, thereby maintaining the basic moral equality of adversaries even amid profound disagreement. Revel’s insistence on recognizing “innocent people” who can be “hurt and even killed” in partisan conflicts foregrounds these ethical stakes, reminding would‑be militants that the costs of escalation are borne not only by elites but by ordinary citizens.
Legally, liberal‑democratic systems draw a sharp line between protected speech and assembly, on one hand, and criminal acts of violence or coercion, on the other. Nonviolent civic engagement—campaigning, voting, peaceful protesting, and advocacy—is typically shielded by constitutional and statutory protections, whereas assaults, batteries, and destructive acts invite criminal prosecution, civil liability, and potentially long‑term disenfranchisement. Thus, nonviolence is not only ethically superior but also the path most consistent with maintaining one’s capacity to continue political participation over time.
Strategic Implications for Contemporary American Politics
The empirical record suggests that movements embracing disciplined nonviolence are better positioned to attract broad coalitions, elicit elite defections, and secure durable policy gains than those that resort to violence. For contemporary American actors—whether opposing or defending the current administration—this implies that energy is best directed toward building mass nonviolent campaigns, electoral strategies, and institutional reforms rather than toward confrontational or insurrectionary tactics.
Revel’s call to invest in “public discourse, political campaigns, debates, and elections, and even in private conversations” can be read as a strategic blueprint: it invites citizens to see every communicative and participatory arena as a site of civil resistance, where persuasion and organizing replace intimidation. In a highly mediatized and polarized environment, maintaining this nonviolent discipline is itself a form of resistance to the normalization of political cruelty and the erosion of democratic norms.
Conclusion
Drawing together comparative research and recent U.S. experience, this article has argued that nonviolent civil resistance is both more effective and more ethically defensible than violent confrontation in addressing contemporary political conflicts in the United States. Historical and modern examples—from the civil rights and suffrage movements to recent mass protests—demonstrate the capacity of nonviolence to secure transformative gains while preserving democratic legitimacy, whereas episodes like the January 6 attack illustrate how criminal violence undermines movements and threatens constitutional order. Gary Revel’s campaign for nonviolence, therefore, should be understood not merely as a moral exhortation but as an empirically grounded strategy for democratic self‑preservation in an era of acute polarization.
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Chenoweth, E. (2023). “Nonviolent resistance proves potent weapon.” Harvard Gazette.
Commons Library. (2025). “Civil Resistance and the 3.5% Rule: An Overview.”
Nonviolence International New York. (2024). “30+ Examples of Nonviolent Campaigns and How They Were Successful.”
Opposition to Suffrage — History of U.S. Woman’s Suffrage. (2016). National Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage (NAOWS) overview.
“January 6 United States Capitol attack.” Wikipedia (accessed 2025).
“January 6 crimes did happen. Evidence proves it.” WHYY (2024).
Revel, G. (2025). Unpublished call for nonviolence and campaign for civil engagement in contemporary U.S. politics.
For more about Gary Revel use his Global Gateway – https://garyrevel.com
